The Alliance’s Most Urgent and Least Popular Defense Requirements

NATO’s most pressing capability gaps are not the ones that attract political enthusiasm or public support. They are expensive, industrially demanding, ethically complex, and often environmentally unfashionable. Yet they are also

the capabilities that determine whether the Alliance can deter, fight, and win against adversaries who are already investing in them at scale. The uncomfortable truth is that the systems democracies hesitate to buy are the very ones autocracies are producing without pause.

Long Range Fires; over-talked about, underestimated

Precision strike at distance is the defining advantage of modern warfare, but it remains one of NATO’s most underdeveloped capabilities. Long-range fires require exquisite intelligence, costly munitions, and deep interoperability conditions that only a handful of Allies can currently meet. Meanwhile, Russia and China are producing these systems in volume. Without the ability to shape the deep fight, disrupt logistics, and impose operational dilemmas, NATO will be forced to fight on terms set by its adversaries.

Industrial Scale “Dumb” Munitions

The Alliance must confront an unglamorous reality: wars are still won by volume. Artillery shells, rockets, and anti‑tank mines remain indispensable, even if they are politically awkward and environmentally contentious. Russia is producing them at First World War levels and using them without hesitation. NATO’s stockpiles are not prepared for a prolonged conflict, and until they are, deterrence remains incomplete.

AI‑Driven Information Dominance

The side that finds, decides, and targets faster will dominate future battlefields. AI‑enabled networks capable of operating at machine speed will determine the tempo of operations. These systems will be controversial because they challenge long-held assumptions about human control and ethical boundaries. But adversaries will not slow down to accommodate Western discomfort. NATO must build these capabilities quickly, securely, and responsibly or risk fighting blind and slow.

Integrated Air and Missile Defense

The threat to Allied cities and critical infrastructure is no longer theoretical. From Ukraine to the Gulf, the future is already visible: constant attacks, diverse threat vectors, and the need for a layered defense that combines early warning, short-range systems, long-range interceptors, and fifth-generation aircraft. Without this architecture, NATO nations remain exposed. This is not a discretionary investment; it is the price of national survival.

Survivable, Distributed Command and Control

If a headquarters can be found, it can be destroyed. Large, static command posts belong to a more forgiving era. The future of C2 is distributed, mobile, cloud-enabled, and low signature. Ukraine has already embraced this out of necessity. NATO must do it by design. This is not a conceptual debate; it is a requirement for any Allied command post that expects to function under fire.

Unmanned Warfare at Machine Tempo

Drones in the air and maritime domains, along with counter-drone systems, are evolving at a pace that traditional procurement systems cannot match. What works today will fail tomorrow. The winning formula will be rapid adaptation, 3D-printed components, software updates at commercial speed, and a workforce capable of innovating in the fight. The field may be crowded, but the capability is non-negotiable.

Electronic Warfare as the Invisible High Ground

Electronic warfare has become the dominant, least understood, and least appreciated domain of the Russia-Ukraine war. It shapes everything from artillery survivability to drone effectiveness to GPS reliability. It is technically demanding, training-intensive, and difficult to explain to politicians. But it is decisive. EW will define the operational environment from the corps level to the squad. Ignoring it is strategic malpractice.

The through line across all these requirements is unmistakable. They are costly, industrially burdensome, and politically inconvenient. But they are also the foundation of credible deterrence and the prerequisites for victory. If the Alliance wants to deter, it must invest. If it wants to win, it must scale. And if it wants to survive, make the investments that count.

Disclaimer. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Government, Department of the Army, or Department of War, or that of any organization the author has been affiliated with, including the NATO.